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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the proliferation of EU powers to enter into international obligations 
has raised concerns about the respect the EU places upon Member States’ autonomy to 
conduct foreign policy at the national level. This article provides a fresh take on the EU 
doctrine of implied powers by examining its current scope as well as its implications for 
national autonomy to unilaterally conclude international agreements. Since the doctrine 
has been encapsulated in the Lisbon Treaty, the article provides a discussion of the 
constitutionalisation of EU implied external powers and offers new insights into 
established case law. It discusses whether the Lisbon codification is a shorthand 
solution which does little justice to the otherwise detailed jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) in ensuring the proper balancing of powers between the EU 
and the Member States in the foreign policy realm.  
 
Introduction 
 
It is a long-established practice that in the field of EU foreign policy, the EU may 
broadly act by means of adopting unilateral / autonomous measures (under Title V TEU 
and Parts 4 and 5 TFEU) or via the conclusion of international agreements (under 
Article 218 TFEU). As regards the latter, in most cases, the EU legislature has to find an 
express power in the Treaties which provides the EU with explicit authorisation to 
conclude international agreements in a given field with one or more third countries or 
international organisations.
1
 In other cases, however, it is accepted that EU external 
powers emerge from Treaty legal bases allowing for internal action and from measures 
adopted within the framework of those provisions by the EU Institutions. Under such 
(internal) legal bases the EU may pursue international cooperation by concluding 
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 For example when it comes to EU policy on the environment, Article 191 (4) TFEU expressly provides 
for EU external competence to cooperate with third countries and international organisations via the 
negotiation of agreements. 
2  
relevant agreements. In the absence of any such express powers in the Treaty (either 
internal or external) the CJEU has provided that the EU may still be competent to enter 
into international agreements – such competence “may also be implied from those 
provisions”.2  
 
In the past forty years or so, the CJEU has indeed filled in the gaps of the EU 
constitutional framework in the external arena by developing its implied competence 
reasoning in numerous thematically diverse cases. These range from inter-institutional 
disputes (resolved through Article 263 TFEU) to CJEU opinions (delivered under 
Article 218 (11) TFEU) on EU competence to conclude international agreements in the 
fields of transport, safety in the workplace, commercial policy in respect of services and 
the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
3
 The principles 
emanating from the CJEU’s voluminous and sometimes complex case law are post-
Lisbon somewhat condensed in Article 216 (1) TFEU, which provides: 
  
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope. 
 
This contribution focuses on the powers of the EU to impliedly conclude international 
agreements under the post-Lisbon dispensation when it is 'necessary' to achieve one of 
the objectives listed in Article 216 (1) TFEU. It is divided into two main parts. The first 
part provides a discussion of the circumstances under which the EU currently possesses 
implied Treaty-making powers. In doing so, it unfolds Article 216 (1) TFEU as the 
provision which amounts to a codification of the doctrine of EU implied external 
powers. In short, the first part of this article discusses whether Article 216 (1) TFEU 
constitutes a clarification of the doctrine of implied powers or rather a mere reduction of 
complex case law within a single Treaty provision. The second part of this article 
assesses the limitations of Article 216 (1) TFEU through an assessment of its legal 
profile as a general competence norm and its effect in previously intergovernmental 
areas.  
 
                                                 
2
 Opinion 2/94 (ECHR) [1996] ECR I-1759, para 26. 
3
 See for reference Council v Commission (ERTA) (22/70) [1971] ECR 263; Opinion 1/76 (Inland 
Waterways) [1977] ECR 741; Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention) [1993] ECR I-1061; Opinion 1/94 (WTO 
Agreement) [1994] ECRI-5267; Opinion 2/94 (ECHR) [1996] ECR I-1759; Opinion 1/03 (Lugano 
Convention) [2006] ECR I–1145. 
3 Accepted copy: (2014) 39 (4) European Law Review 511-530 
Although the main focus of this article is based on a technical area of EU law, it aims to 
address the EU law savvy reader in as much as the less EU law expert in order to help 
comprehend the complexities of EU foreign policy and throw light on what are not 
easily accessible parts of this general area of the first importance. This is crucial now 
that the price of EU membership has been put into question by a number of old Member 
States, including the UK and the Netherlands. The article helps to grasp how precisely 
the language of the Lisbon Treaty reflects the CJEU’s past jurisprudence on EU external 
policy and how might the CJEU interpret the relevant provisions when it will be given 
the opportunity to do so in future cases (the codification angle). It also addresses the 
issue of whether in the absence of express Treaty authorisation the existence of EU 
implied powers to enter into international agreements constitutes a cause for concern for 
Member States (the constitutional/subsidiarity angle).  
 
Apart from the obvious codification issues that necessitate a fresh analysis of the 
doctrine of implied powers, the discussion in this article is topical in light of certain 
developments. First, the parallel codification in Lisbon - along with the existence of 
implied powers under Article 216 (1) TFEU - of implied exclusivity in Article 3 (2) 
TFEU muddies the waters vis-à-vis the conformity of the Lisbon Treaty with past 
CJEU jurisprudence on the nature of implied powers. Second, Advocate General 
Kokott’s recent insightful opinions in UK v Council4 and Commission v Council5 raise 
considerable interest because they constitute the first formal attempts post Lisbon to 
demystify Article 216 (1) TFEU, albeit as a side issue to the cases at hand. One could 
argue that we shall not rely too heavily on Kokott's analysis of Article 216 (1) TFEU 
which may have no resonance in the CJEU’s future case law. The present author, 
however, not only finds her reasonings pragmatic but also utilises them to make 
speculations about future judicial clarification of the doctrine of EU implied powers to 
conclude international agreements.
6
  
 
Codification drawbacks 
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The doctrine of implied powers currently expressed in Article 216 (1) TFEU originates 
from the EU Constitutional Treaty and owes its existence to the European Convention’s 
Working Group on External Action.
7
 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the former EC Treaty 
bestowed express power to the EU to sign international agreements only in limited 
instances. Such power was supplemented by the CJEU’s jurisprudence delineating the 
circumstances in which there could be an implied external competence to that effect.
8
 
The Convention’s Working Group on External Action recommended that there should 
be an express Treaty provision that reflects this case law. This was later materialised in 
the EU Constitutional Treaty’s almost laconic Article III-323 (1). This provision was 
transferred almost intact into the Lisbon Treaty in the form of Article 216 (1) TFEU.  
 
The aim of current Article 216 (1) TFEU is plain, i.e. to codify the CJEU’s voluminous 
case law on the EU’s external implied powers in order to arrive at a clearer competence 
delimitation. Yet, the draftsman’s refusal to adhere to a single reference point (or 
judgment) is what sets Article 216 (1) TFEU apart from other provisions aiming to 
codify the CJEU’s case law. For instance, there is no clarification in the Treaty of 
Lisbon about which CJEU judgment(s) Article 216 (1) TFEU aims to codify. A 
Declaration would have, therefore, been helpful in the same manner that Declaration 17 
attached to the Treaty of Lisbon on the principle of EU law primacy is explicit about the 
case law of the CJEU.
9
 Since the analysis of the CJEU’s case law on implied powers has 
been thorough elsewhere, we will limit our examination to the quality of its codification 
in the Treaty.
10
 Having said that, we may occasionally afford a short detour to 
summarise the CJEU’s jurisprudence in order to remind the reader of how European 
judges have perceived the EU’s implied powers and consider whether their vision has 
been recorded correctly by the Treaty drafter.  
 
Implied Powers in the Lisbon Treaty 
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According to the CJEU’s established case law, EU competence to conclude international 
agreements may emerge not only from an express conferment by the Treaty but may 
equally flow implicitly from i) other provisions of the Treaty and ii) from measures 
adopted within the framework of those provisions by EU Institutions.
11
 What is more, 
the CJEU has accepted that iii) whenever EU law creates, for EU Institutions, powers 
within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the EU has 
authority to undertake international commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision to that effect.
12
 The latter is also 
known as the principle of parallelism.
13
  
 
Almost in the same vein, while taking stock of the express treaty-making provisions 
provided in the Treaties, Article 216 (1) TFEU constitutes a residual competence under 
which the EU may conclude an international agreement with one or more third countries 
or international organisations in the following three situations: i) where the Treaties so 
provide, ii) where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the EU’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties (also known as the principle of necessity), and iii) [where the conclusion of an 
agreement] is provided for in a legally binding EU act or is likely to affect common 
rules or alter their scope.  
 
We will hereafter consider each situation in turn by discussing, in particular, how the 
Lisbon Treaty has codified the principles of parallelism and necessity. We will also 
look briefly into the meaning of common rules. We shall note from the outset that the 
first situation covered in Article 216 (1) TFEU (viz. conclusion of an international 
agreement where the Treaties so provide) acknowledges the express primary treaty-
making powers conferred to the EU by the Treaty under Articles 4 (1) TEU and Article 
5 TEU. As such, it is rather self-explanatory and does not create any operational 
problems, so it will not be considered thereafter. Suffice to stress, however, that the 
wording of Article 216 (1) TFEU is somewhat elliptical; although it places emphasis on 
the existence of implied powers it does not seem to take into account their nature 
(exclusive or shared). Whilst implied exclusive powers are codified in Article 3 (2) 
TFEU, implied shared powers are not expressly mentioned in the Treaty. Therefore, a 
corrective reading of Article 216 (1) TFEU should not only include implied exclusive 
powers under Article 3 (2) TFEU but also the principles emanating from the past 
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jurisprudence of the CJEU on implied shared external competence which does not enjoy 
textual reference under any provision in the Lisbon Treaty.
14
  
 
Parallelism and Necessity: A slippery formulation of implied powers 
 
Two key principles arising from the CJEU’s case law are important in the codification 
of the doctrine of implied powers: those of parallelism and necessity.  
 
As it is well-documented, the principle of parallelism stems from ERTA, a classic 
authority in the field of EU external relations law. It is well-known that ERTA 
concerned a dispute between the Commission and Council over the negotiation of an 
international road transport agreement on safety rules in the absence of an express 
Treaty provision on external competence.
15
 The CJEU pointed out that the adoption of a 
common transport policy formed a Treaty objective and that common rules for its 
attainment had already been laid down by an EU Regulation.
16
 It was held, therefore, 
that the Treaty’s internal provisions (in foro interno) in the field of transport legitimised 
EU external action in the same field (in foro externo).  
 
What is more, Member States were pre-empted in ERTA from unilateral external action 
in the field of transport (the doctrine of pre-emption). The CJEU stressed that in the 
case at hand the conclusion of international agreements on road transport by Member 
States acting outside of the common institutions would not only jeopardise EU internal 
competences but would also be detrimental to the unity of the common market and the 
uniform application of EU law. With this in mind, the CJEU highlighted that the EU 
could enter into international agreements both by virtue of express conferment and by 
relying on other Treaty provisions and measures adopted by the EU legislature in the 
framework of those provisions. Once exercised, such power could become exclusive. 
Such exclusive implied external competence or derived exclusivity is now manifest in 
Article 3 (2) TFEU, which is discussed later in the context of the constitutional 
limitations of EU implied powers. 
 
To return to the principle of parallelism, Article 216 (1) TFEU embraces the CJEU’s in 
foro interno - in foro externo motif and expands the ERTA effect even further. Its 
wording implies that international agreements can be based on either the list of EU 
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objectives mentioned, for instance, in Article 3 TEU or a decision adopted in an area 
under the Treaties, such as Title V of the TFEU (Area of Freedom Security and Justice). 
On the one hand, this broad formulation confirms the elusiveness characterising the 
doctrine of implied powers as first established in ERTA. On the other hand, it keeps EU 
external action adaptable to changing needs. Furthermore, similar to ERTA, Article 216 
(1) TFEU is in par with the doctrine of pre-emption, which constitutes the external 
axiom of the principle of EU law primacy.
17
 
 
Not only did the ERTA parallelism dicta and its codification in the Lisbon Treaty render 
the doctrine of implied powers slippery. In addition, post-ERTA, the abstract test of 
necessity became increasingly important in establishing that recourse to an external 
competence is instrumental in achieving a Treaty objective.
18
 This means that the ERTA 
implied powers no more depend solely on the content and scope of EU primary law and 
existing secondary legislation. Instead, they are equally determined by the necessity of 
an effective use of the treaty-making power in each situation. In an attempt to capture 
the essence of the whole corpus of the CJEU’s case law on implied powers, Article 216 
(1) TFEU confirms such a necessity-driven assessment of implied powers. Nonetheless, 
necessity is too foggy a notion to justify any EU action because it links EU external 
competence with broad Treaty objectives rather than explicit internal legal bases. It is 
argued, therefore, that the constitutionalisation of necessity as a cause of recourse to 
external competence appears to compromise the orthodoxy embedded in the principle of 
parallelism - i.e that only the existence of an internal provision empowers the EU to act 
externally.  
 
But where does the principle of necessity originate from? Necessity first became 
prominent in Opinion 1/76 concerning the negotiation of an Agreement establishing a 
European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels.
19
 Contrary to its previous 
decision in ERTA, the CJEU disregarded whether the primary law provision on common 
transport policy provided implicitly for a treaty-making power. Instead, it pointed out 
that the competence to bind the EU in relation to third countries could arise by 
implication from the Treaty provisions establishing internal powers in the field of 
transport. It was therefore sufficient that the conclusion of an international agreement 
setting up a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels was necessary to 
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attain a Treaty objective. In such a situation, the CJEU suggested that a treaty-making 
power does not even require the previous adoption of secondary legislation – it can 
rather emerge out of necessity.
20
 As such, the CJEU provided an alternative formulation 
of the parallelism principle which was not coupled by any restriction upon the EU's 
discretion to exercise its external competence. In essence, the CJEU merely made the 
use of implied powers subject to the subjective and rather unpredictable test of 
necessity.   
 
It is not surprising that Opinion 1/76 has been criticised for contradicting the Treaty’s 
orthodoxy vis-à-vis the EU’s respect to the principle of conferral.21 This is perhaps due 
to the case's peculiar factual and legal background concerning Rhine navigation and the 
overcapacity in barges on certain waterways which involved vessels from Switzerland. 
According to the CJEU it was not possible to eliminate the economic situation caused 
by the inland waterways overcapacity without first establishing autonomous common 
rules. It was therefore necessary to bring Switzerland into the scheme by means of an 
international agreement. As illustrated, the Laying-up Fund Agreement was necessary 
in order to achieve the Treaty’s (transport) objectives. Seen in this perspective, Opinion 
1/76 shall be treated as an exception – a case where the CJEU was being pragmatic, 
establishing that the EU may in certain circumstances achieve the Treaty's objectives 
only if it is capable of concluding international agreements to that effect. 
 
The CJEU softened its Opinion 1/76 approach in later cases, especially in Opinion 1/94 
which involved the question of EU competence to conclude all parts of the WTO 
Agreement concerning trade in Services (GATS) and trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property (TRIPS) on the basis of the Treaty. The dispute was focused first, 
on the issue of competence of the EU to conclude all the parts of the WTO Agreement 
which related exclusively to the scope of the Treaties’ application. Second, the case 
concerned the effect of the exercise of such competence upon the ability of Member 
States to conclude the WTO Agreement unilaterally. In its judgment the CJEU 
narrowed severely the circumstances in which action to attain EU objectives may be 
necessary. Opinion 1/94 is indicative of the CJEU’s self-restrain in holding inter alia 
that the EU may have exclusive implied external competence to regulate services and 
intellectual property only where it has adopted secondary legislation or where it has 
adopted provisions which concern third country nationals. In the end, the WTO 
Agreements were jointly concluded by the Commission and the Member States. This is 
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because at the time there was no internal EU legislation in place which would (even 
remotely) be relied upon by the EU legislature to enter into international agreements in 
the fields of trade in services and intellectual property. This position has changed since 
the coming into force of the   Lisbon Treaty whereby trade in services and commercial 
aspects of intellectual property are no more treated as different from the trade of 
goods.
22
  
 
The Place of Mixity in the context of Implied Powers  
 
The recognition of shared competence in Opinion 1/94 had considerable impact upon  
the role of the Member States as complementary actors in EU external relations. The 
competence symbiosis advocated by the CJEU in the conclusion of the WTO 
Agreements is still significant in the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of 
international agreements. Currently, shared competence constitutes more often than not 
“the rule rather than the exception” in the conduct of EU foreign policy.23 The mixity 
formula
24
 promoted by the CJEU in Opinion 1/94 has facilitated EU external action in a 
range of fields.
25
  
 
At one level, the CJEU has been effective in managing mixity by pointing Member 
States to the duty of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU and the 
requirement of unity in the EU’s international representation.26 At another level, it has 
recognised mixity as a means of safeguarding national competences in the absence of 
implied pre-emption emanating from EU external action. According to a commentator, 
“mixed agreements are an evolving phenomenon. What is mixed competence today may 
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be exclusive [EU] competence tomorrow.”27 This comment is taken to mean that while 
at times the conclusion of an international agreement by the EU entails a practice of 
competence restraint, in other cases it involves competence enhancement. Despite the 
unpredictability of mixity, it is important to mention that Opinion 1/94 reflects the 
current European judges’ understanding of necessity in the use of implied powers. This 
is a rather balanced approach which refutes the all-encompassing advancement of the 
CJEU in Opinion 1/76. 
 
But how does the concept of mixity play out with the use of Article 216 (1) TFEU in 
order, for instance, to amend a mixed agreement concluded simultaneously by the EU 
and its Member States? In the recent UK v Council, Advocate General Kokott explored 
the theoretical possibility of utilising Article 216 (1) TFEU for extending EU social 
legislation to third countries via an amendment of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
Agreement. The EEA was established through a mixed agreement between the then 
EEC, the ECSC, the EC Member States and the EFTA members.
28
 The facts of UK v 
Council will be explained in more detail later. At this stage, suffice to mention that the 
Advocate General pointed to Article 216 (1) TFEU as a potential legal basis for 
amending the EEA Agreement. The amendment was necessary in order to achieve 
parity between the EU and the EEA social conditions in place rather than to expand EU 
external competence in the field of social policy.
29
 The parallelism between the EEA 
Agreement and EU internal market law constituted the point of departure for 
considering the use of Article 216 (1) TFEU in the context of amending the EEA 
agreement. As commented by the Advocate General in the more recent Commission v 
Council, when the EU acts in the external domain ‘establishing and ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market falls within the meaning of Article 216 (1) TFEU’.30  
 
Implied Powers and the Notion of Common Rules 
 
Although the logic of the parallelism principle appears somewhat straightforward, its 
scope still remains uncertain. This is particularly the case when it comes to the notion of 
common rules, which features both in the final variant of Article 216 (1) TFEU as well 
as the CJEU’s judgments on implied powers. The idea is that an international agreement 
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shall be impliedly concluded by the EU where it is likely to affect common rules or alter 
their scope. The CJEU has built its case law on the matter on a trial and error basis. For 
instance, in ERTA it established that whenever the EU adopts common rules (whatever 
form these may take) using a legal basis drawn from the Treaties to implement a 
common policy envisaged in the Treaty, the Member States lose their right to act 
unilaterally in order to enter into agreements with third countries in a way which will 
affect those rules.
31
 The CJEU used a somewhat similar tone in its Open Skies 
judgments on external air transport policy but arrived at a different assessment of 
implied powers.  
 
In Open Skies a number of infringement cases were brought by the Commission against 
eight Member States (including the UK, Denmark and Germany) challenging the 
legality of bilateral agreements on air transport concluded between them and the US.
32
 
The Commission contended inter alia that the Member States in question did not have 
the treaty-making competence to conclude bilateral agreements on access of airlines to 
international airports with the US; such agreements are exclusive in nature to Member 
States which are not parties. Instead, the Commission submitted that these agreements 
were in breach of the right to establishment under Article 47 TFEU and as such the EU 
had exclusive competence on the matter. In its judgment, the CJEU held that by virtue 
of the ERTA dicta, Member States cannot enter into agreements on matters which fall 
under EU exclusive powers. Most significantly, the CJEU focused on whether the EU 
harmonisation measures (or common rules) at hand adopted under Article 100 (2) 
TFEU in the field of sea and air transport were affected by virtue of the conduct of the 
eight defaulting Member States. The CJEU illustrated the continued relevance of the 
ERTA doctrine ex post the adoption of harmonisation measures. In particular, it posited 
that the objective pursued by EU harmonisation measures on air transportation 
(particularly on air fares and rates on intra-EU routes and on computerised reservations 
systems) would have been negatively affected if Member States were entitled to 
conclude their own bilateral international agreements with third countries.  
 
Recent jurisprudence suggests that the CJEU has adopted a sectoral approach to EU’s 
external competence. In that sense, it has departed from its ERTA reliance on the effet-
utile of a competence of primary law laid down in the Treaty. Its new narrow approach 
to external powers is deduced from a thorough analysis of particular EU law provisions. 
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This novelty, criticised for rendering the ERTA doctrine unpredictable,
33
 has no doubt 
been shaped by the development of express organising principles in the EU legal order. 
The principles of conferral and proportionality enshrined in Article 5 TEU, for instance, 
have altered the previous all-encompassing approach to implied powers based on the 
effet-utile principle.
34
  
 
Constitutional limitations 
 
A set of constitutional questions emerge when one considers the utility of Article 216 
(1) TFEU. Some of these questions go beyond the nebulous issue of Lisbon’s 
codification of past CJEU jurisprudence explored so far. They touch upon issues 
regarding the legal nature of the doctrine of implied powers. For example, one should 
note the position of the doctrine vis-à-vis the introduction of specific legal bases in the 
Lisbon Treaty and their potential effect on future resort to Article 216 (1) TFEU. 
Furthermore, the possibility of a spill-over effect of Article 216 (1) TFEU on previously 
intergovernmental areas due to the abolition of the former EU Pillar structure is key to 
Lisbon’s reforms.  
 
Last but not least, the relationship between the doctrine of implied powers and derived 
exclusivity as manifested in Article 3 (2) TFEU deserves special attention. The 
resolution of these issues is crucial in order to determine the boundaries of national 
autonomy to conclude international agreements. This section argues that the fragile 
nature of Article 216 (1) TFEU as a general competence norm, the Treaty’s inherent 
limits to the use of implied powers in previously intergovernmental areas and cross-
sectoral international agreements and, finally, the obscure nature of implied powers as 
to when they are exclusive or shared will potentially minimise future resort to the 
doctrine of implied powers. 
 
A Fragile General Competence Norm 
 
When reading Article 216 (1) TFEU it is worth considering that the CJEU developed 
the doctrine of implied external powers due to the lack of express external powers in the 
original Treaty of Rome (1957) which provided only for treaty-making powers in the 
context of the Common Commercial Policy (ex Article 113 EEC) and Association 
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Agreements (ex Article 238 EEC). In light of the proliferation of new competences in 
every Treaty revision, it can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty hardly lacks express 
provisions which could trigger the use of implied powers to achieve the EU’s external 
objectives. Since Article 216 (1) TFEU constitutes a general competence norm, the 
question turns on whether implied external powers are necessary anymore, considering 
that new express powers were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
As mentioned, there are specific legal bases now conferring competences to the EU that 
relate explicitly to almost every field of external action. One needs to be reminded that 
prior to the Lisbon Treaty, these express external competences were scattered all across 
the former EC Treaty. Post-Lisbon, however, EU express external powers constitute 
Part Five of the TFEU.
35
 Humanitarian aid comprises a new legal basis added to the 
Treaty by Lisbon. In the same manner, under Article 215 TFEU, Lisbon provides for the 
legal basis for implementing CFSP decisions on the imposition of economic sanctions 
or restrictive measures. This provision provides a means for implementing UN Security 
Council Resolutions. It also establishes a specific competence norm for the so-called 
“smart sanctions”, so that reliance on the subsidiary competence under Article 352 
TFEU for their adoption is no more necessary.
36
  
 
Finally, the Solidarity Clause under Article 222 TFEU is a new but rather obscure 
provision, since the triggering event (albeit in the form of natural, man-made disaster or 
terrorist attack) may not necessarily originate from an external source.
37
 Still, however, 
Article 222 TFEU is rationalised as a legal basis on external action because it 
complements the Member States’ external commitment under Article 42 (7) TEU. The 
latter is known as the mutual assistance clause and it has been attached to the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, given the rich 
amount of new legal competences in Lisbon, it is easy to conclude that there is no added 
value in the constitutionalisation of implied powers.  
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Against the above argument, we shall note that there remain numerous policy areas 
where the “internal” legal basis makes no reference to the possibility of the EU acting 
“externally” by way of conclusion of international agreements.38 As a result, the EU 
may still act externally in certain areas by using the implied powers doctrine. It cannot, 
therefore, be argued with any certainty how frequent resort to implied powers will be in 
future. The revolving door will be there but simply would not be easily opened in light 
of the rich body of express legal competences in the field of external action written in 
the TFEU. Although it appears rare in the current setting that the EU will experience a 
shortage of express provisions which will allow it to conclude international agreements, 
there is a possibility that the EU may wish to act externally in areas that the Treaty 
drafter did not foresee. Having said that, a specific legal basis would always be 
preferable. For instance, in UK v Council, discussed earlier in the context of Article 216 
(1) TFEU configuration, Advocate General Kokott was confronted with the question of 
legal basis vis-à-vis the EU’s external action. The issue concerned the legal basis EU 
Institutions may resort to in order to extend EU internal legislation on social security 
systems to third countries by virtue of amendments into existing mixed agreements 
(more precisely the EEA Agreement).
39
 The Advocate General considered the action for 
annulment brought by the UK against Decision 2011/407 which established the position 
to be taken by the EU in the EEA and stressed that as an alternative to its original legal 
bases of Article 48 TFEU (social security) and 218 (9) TFEU (negotiation of 
international agreements) the contested Decision:  
 
... can also be based on the ERTA doctrine, as expressed in Article 216 (1) 
TFEU. Since, however, in Article 217 TFEU [conclusion of international 
agreements establishing association] there is another, more specific 
substantive legal basis for the contested decision, recourse should not be 
had, in the final analysis, to Article 216 (1) TFEU, but to Article 217 
TFEU.
40
 
In the case at hand, Article 217 TFEU (formerly Article 238 EEC) constituted the legal 
basis under which the EU concluded the EEA Agreement in the first place. Kokott’s 
Opinion therefore correctly suggests that resort to Article 216 (1) TFEU would be 
secondary in light of a more specific legal basis for the conclusion of an international 
agreement.  
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The present author has made elsewhere the same argument with reference to Article 352 
TFEU.
41
 Indeed, Article 216 (1) TFEU is comparable to the general law-making power 
of Article 352 TFEU. With reference to Article 352 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty has 
expanded the possibilities of resorting to it by relaxing the link between the EU’s 
internal objectives and its external policies. Yet, although Article 352 TFEU goes 
further than its former self (Article 308 EC), in that it is no longer linked to powers 
“necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community” but covers all areas of the EU’s activity (apart from 
CFSP), its inherent limitations make self-conferral by the EU a difficult task. 
Declaration 42 explicitly mentions that Article 352 TFEU cannot be used to evade the 
ordinary Treaty revision procedure under Article 48 TEU. Furthermore, a number of 
new specific legal bases introduced in the Lisbon Treaty have made recourse to Article 
352 TFEU harder. This is evident in the modest number of proposals under Article 352 
TFEU since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
42
  
 
Article 216 (1) TFEU, on the other hand, appears broader compared to Article 352 
TFEU. For instance, unlike Article 352 TFEU, there is no express limitation in Article 
216 (1) TFEU that implied powers will not encroach on CFSP, although this is highly 
unlikely. The same is true about the potential spill-over effect of implied powers to pre-
Lisbon areas of intergovernmental cooperation. Indeed Article 216 (1) seems to have 
loosened the link between internal objectives and external action as such. The Lisbon 
Treaty seems to endorse that action under Article 216 (1) TFEU encompasses any 
matter of foreign policy that comes under EU objectives.  
 
Does reference to “objectives” imply that the draftsman’s intention was to reach beyond 
prior case law, rendering Article 216 (1) a procrustean frame? Schütze has warned that 
if the CJEU interprets the parallelism that arises from the text of Article 216 (1) TFEU 
literally then the EU will gain another, perhaps stronger, residual power on top of 
Article 352 TFEU for external action.
43
 This view chimes with Advocate General 
Kokott’s Opinion in Commission v Council, where she mentions that the EU’s external 
competence in connection with the functioning of the internal market falls within the 
scope of Article 216 (1) TFEU and not Article 114 TFEU as one would have 
imagined.
44
 As a result, Article 216 (1) TFEU appears to constitute a “two in one” deal 
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in the law of EU external relations. It combines the might of Article 114 TFEU and the 
flexibility of Article 352 TFEU in a single provision. But is this development as 
alarming as it sounds? In order to provide an answer, we need to examine Article 216 
(1) TFEU in the light of Article 352 TFEU and Article 114 TFEU. 
 
With reference to Article 352 TFEU, back in the days of the European Community the 
provision was effectively utilised in different ways: from a legal basis for EU external 
action in the field of human rights
45
 to an inter-pillar legal basis.
46
 Post-Lisbon, 
however, Article 352 TFEU has been amended in such a way that it looks as if the 
Treaty drafter codified the CJEU’s ruling in Kadi I which distinguished between the 
objectives of the former European Community and those of the European Union.
47
 
Under the ToL, the bridge between the TFEU and the TEU does not extend to Article 
352 TFEU. In this respect, it can be argued with some certainty that Article 216 (1) 
TFEU has effectively replaced Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis where no alternative 
specific legal basis exists vis-à-vis implied external competence.48 This is indeed a 
development worthy of observation especially because of the practicalities of utilising 
Article 216 (1) TFEU as opposed to Article 352 TFEU which has numerous safeguards 
written to it and, most importantly, resort to it is subject to unanimity.
49
  
 
By contrast to Article 352 TFEU, the vocabulary of Article 216 (1) TFEU does not 
maintain any comparable express constraints to its use regarding voting in the Council 
or even establish a national monitoring procedure for subsidiarity compliance by the EU 
legislature.
50
 The procedural basis for the “implied” conclusion of agreements with third 
countries or international organisations is provided by Article 218 TFEU. Article 218 
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(8) TFEU, in particular, stresses that the Council shall act by qualified majority voting 
save from agreements in fields where unanimity is required for the adoption of EU acts, 
association agreements and the prospective accession of the EU to ECHR. One may, 
therefore, argue that due to qualified majority voting and its broad character, Article 216 
(1) TFEU might turn into a new legal basis for the conclusion of international 
agreements in controversial areas. 
 
With respect to Article 114 TFEU, long before Lisbon, when the Treaty did not bestow 
the former European Community with adequate competence to legislate in certain areas 
(e.g. the development of a common public health policy), EU Institutions employed the 
Treaty’s implied power under former Article 114 TFEU on the basis of the EU’s 
functional competences (e.g. in order to eliminate distortions of competition by the 
provisions of national law). Hence the “accusation” that Article 114 TFEU has been 
‘complicit in the crime of competence creep’.51 With the emergence of Article 216 (1) 
TFEU it seems that Article 114 TFEU has been deprived of the opportunity to branch 
out to the area of EU foreign policy because it is focused on establishing or ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market.
52
  
 
The above development does not make Article 216 (1) TFEU an all-encompassing 
competence in the foreign policy terrain. While, for instance, in Commission v Council 
Advocate General Kokott explained her preference for employing Article 216 (1) TFEU 
over Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis for giving effect to an international agreement 
on audiovisual services by drawing a line between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’, in the 
end she relied on a specific legal basis for setting uniform legal standards with a view to 
facilitating cross-border trade. Article 207 TFEU was regarded as a suitable legal basis 
for signing the Convention at hand.
53
 It is argued that the CJEU will most likely adopt a 
similar orthodox stance vis-à-vis EU implied powers – i.e. that even as a harmonisation 
provision, Article 216 (1) TFEU will always be trumped by a lex specialis. 
 
Implied Powers, the former Pillars and Cross-Sectoral Agreements 
 
As already discussed, at first glance, Article 216 (1) TFEU seems to embrace any matter 
of foreign policy that comes under EU objectives. Its broad wording together with the 
post-Lisbon de-pillarisation of the EU has ironed the traditional “internal”-“external” 
policy schism. Competence under Article 216 (1) TFEU seems to go beyond the scope 
of the ERTA doctrine of parallelism which, as mentioned, sprung out of an internal 
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competence and not an internal objective. Yet, the reference to “one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties” suggests that Article 216 (1) TFEU broadens the scope of EU 
implied powers and, therefore, gives the impression that the ERTA doctrine extends into 
areas of cooperation which previously fell under the former intergovernmental (second 
and third) EU pillars of cooperation.  
 
But how do implied powers relate to matters that fall under the old pillars? The future 
looks promising for the doctrine of implied powers with regard to the former third pillar 
(Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters). It appears that post-Lisbon 
international agreements within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) are 
based on either the objectives or on a decision adopted within the area of the AFSJ 
provisions of the Treaty. This is because despite the external character of AFSJ policies 
(e.g. immigration, asylum, transnational crime), there is no express external competence 
for the EU to act in the field other than Articles 78 (2) (g) and 79 (3) TFEU. The lack of 
express external powers in the AFSJ owes to the fact that it begun its lifecycle as an 
internal policy put together for the benefit of the European citizenry. Implied powers 
may therefore come handy for the Council in this “Area”, which is very much in the 
making and will not fully lift off until this year.   
 
On the other hand, Article 216 (1) TFEU only in theory seems to impact upon the 
former second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) which even after Lisbon 
remains tucked away in the TEU and very much safeguarded by national veto. The way 
the two Treaties (the TFEU and the TEU) are kept separate suggests that the 
jurisdictional scope of the doctrine of implied powers under Article 216 (1) TFEU can 
only go as far as covering the entire TFEU and cannot expand beyond it. In any event, 
Article 216 (1) TFEU only concerns the availability of EU competence to enter into 
international agreements. It cannot be invoked in order to enlarge the range of actions 
that may be taken under the legal basis in question.
54
 In this respect it only comprises a 
petite revision of EU external relations policy.
55 
 
A further challenge posed by the Lisbon Treaty on the use of implied powers is related 
to the choice of legal basis for cross-sectoral international agreements involving 
multiple objectives such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
development. Such multi-tasking is still problematic for EU Institutions. For instance, 
international agreements have to be carefully worded in order to avoid potential 
annulment actions against the secondary legislative provision (e.g. a Council Decision) 
which gives them effect. Such annulment may arise, for instance, due to encroachment 
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by the general exercise of EU power on the CFSP.
56
 This is all the more important 
because the drafting of Article 216 (1) TFEU hints that the provision may be employed 
to pursue equally CFSP as much as non-CFSP objectives. As such, the “non-affectation 
clause” of Article 40 TEU (past Article 47 TEU) has to be used prudently by the CJEU 
as a means of ring-fencing any potential expansion of the scope of EU implied powers 
under Article 216 (1) TFEU by the EU legislature.
57
 The landmark ECOWAS judgment 
involving an action for annulment brought by the Commission against a Council 
Decision that provided financial contributions and assistance to prevent the spread of 
small arms in ECOWAS states forms the only (pre-Lisbon) authority on the delimitation 
between non-CFSP and CFSP legal bases.
58
 There, the CJEU annulled the contested 
Council Decision. It held that under ex Article 47 TEU, the EU could not have recourse 
to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order to adopt provisions which also fall 
within a competence conferred by the former EC Treaty on the Community. As such, 
the measure in question had to be adopted under the former first pillar.  
 
Current Article 40 TEU, however, is different to its predecessor. It does not provide for 
such one-sided protection of the TFEU from possible encroachment by the CFSP. It 
also protects CFSP and in that respect it constitutes a mutual non-affectation clause 
when a legal act touches upon both CFSP and non-CFSP fields. This is important 
because each field is characterised by its own unique procedures. For instance, in the 
recent judgment of Parliament v Council, the CJEU held that a Regulation on “smart 
sanctions”59 was rightly based on Article 215 (2) TFEU, thereby rejecting the European 
Parliament’s argument that the measure ought to have been taken on the basis of Article 
75 TFEU, which ensured a greater degree of parliamentary participation through the 
ordinary legislative procedure.
60  
 
The current absence in Article 40 TEU of the past express preference to non-CFSP legal 
bases implies that European judges will now have the opportunity to adjudicate on 
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whether an alleged TFEU act is in fact a CFSP act and vice versa. The interaction 
between CFSP and TFEU competences under this new dispensation has attracted 
considerable commentary vis-à-vis the new task that the CJEU has been charged with - 
i.e. guarding the boundaries between CFSP and TFEU by upholding the non-affectation 
clause of Article 40 TEU.
61
 It remains to be seen how the CJEU will go on about 
resolving the “conundrum” of legal bases questions in cases where an act under Article 
216 (1) TFEU pursues a mixed objective.
62
 
 
The unclear nature of Implied Powers 
 
Article 216 (1) TFEU gives birth to EU external implied competences without however 
taking into account their nature, whether exclusive or shared. From our discussion it 
arises that EU’s implied external powers can be either exclusive or shared in so far as 
the conclusion of an agreement is “necessary” to fulfil the objectives of the Treaty. On 
the one hand, according to the Lisbon Treaty, implied powers only become exclusive 
when the requirements of Article 3 (2) TFEU have been met. On the other hand, with 
regard to shared competence, the Lisbon Treaty does not contain an express reference to 
implied powers unless, of course, these are explicitly provided in individual areas of 
shared activity between the EU and the Member States.  
 
When it comes to exclusivity, the boundary between EU competences is getting rather 
blurry when one reads Article 216 (1) TFEU in the light of Article 3 (2) TFEU on the 
EU’s exclusive powers, which provides: 
 
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative 
act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter 
their scope. 
 
It shall be mentioned that Article 3 (2) TFEU was also transferred from the EU 
Constitutional Treaty (Article I-13 (2)) into the Lisbon Treaty in an attempt to codify 
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the CJEU’s established jurisprudence on derived exclusivity.63 The term “derived” is 
used here to distinguish such a type of exclusivity from the so-called a priori 
exclusivity or exclusivity in principle enshrined in Article 3 (1) TFEU. According to 
Article 3 (2) TFEU, derived exclusivity emerges where EU competence i) is provided 
for in a legislative act of the EU
64
; ii) it is necessary to enable the EU to exercise its 
internal competence
65
; iii) insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter 
their scope.
66
 The CJEU has, therefore, derived rules establishing that EU competence 
to conclude international agreements is exclusive even in fields where competence is 
shared with the Member States.  
 
In other words, a shared internal competence may paradoxically correspond to an 
exclusive external competence by means of the doctrine of implied powers. Through a 
teleological reading of the principle of loyalty provided in Article 4 (3) TFEU, the 
CJEU established in Opinion 2/91 that the adoption of EU rules internally pre-empts 
Member States from acting externally. In the case of the ILO Convention No 170 the 
CJEU implied an external competence from internal legislation adopted under Article 
153 TFEU (social provisions). This means in essence that Member States are prohibited 
from entering into international agreements that might compromise EU internal rules or 
alter their scope. This is the position regardless of the likelihood of overlap or conflict 
between the EU internal rules and the relevant international agreement that the EU 
wishes to enter into.
67
  
 
Nonetheless, not all EU external powers are exclusive or pre-emptive in nature. For 
instance, in Opinion 2/91 Member States were allowed to maintain or introduce more 
stringent protective measures. Likewise, in subsequent Opinion 1/94, mentioned earlier, 
the EU harmonisation laws in the fields covered by GATS and TRIPS did not cover all 
service sectors. Thus, despite EU exclusive competence to negotiate with non-Member 
States in the field of services, exclusivity did not apply to the whole of GATS. Similarly 
in the Open Skies cases not all aspects of bilateral air services agreements fell within EU 
exclusive competence. The CJEU was explicit that EU exclusive competence will apply 
to the whole agreement if the relevant international agreement is related to an area 
covered ‘to a considerable extent’ by internal rules.68 Last but not least, “the nature and 
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content” of the internal rules as well as the “future development” of EU law in the 
relevant area are also decisive to the establishment of derived exclusivity.
69
 Uniformity 
of EU external action and the unity of the internal market in tune with the principle of 
loyalty found in Article 4 (3) TEU are key in requiring Member States to refrain from 
acting unilaterally.  
 
The above observations aside, until Opinion 1/03 the CJEU never seemed to have found 
the right moment to make a distinction between the existence of implied powers and 
their exclusive or shared nature. Instead most judgments followed the ERTA doctrine  
which was crucial in the development of EU exclusive competence to act externally. In 
the context of the conclusion of the new Lugano Convention by the EU, the CJEU 
stressed that implied powers may be either exclusive or shared. This judicial 
pronouncement in Opinion 1/03 indicates that the recognition of implied shared 
competence is possible even after Lisbon. This is especially because at the time the 
CJEU gave its verdict in Opinion 1/03 in 2006, the doctrine of implied powers was 
already codified in Article III-323 of the EU Constitutional Treaty which pended 
ratification by all Member States. This is an interesting event because, as pointed in the 
introduction of this contribution, Article III-323 is the predecessor of Article 216 (1) 
TFEU. Given this historical background, it appears highly improbable that the effect of 
Opinion 1/03 has been minimised (or indeed taken into account) by Article 216 (1) 
TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty is silent about whether implied powers can be shared. Hence, 
the CJEU’s recognition of the existence of the category of implied shared competence 
following the drafting of Article III-323 of the EU Constitutional Treaty can be used as 
evidence that the CJEU will carry on upholding implied shared powers under the Lisbon 
formulation. This is crucial since similarly to the Lisbon Treaty the EU Constitutional 
Treaty lacked an express reference to implied shared competence.  
 
In addition, the wording of Article 3 (2) TFEU which gives expression to the judicial 
notion of derived exclusivity is very similarly drafted to Article 216 (1) TFEU and it 
can easily be concluded at first sight that post-Lisbon implied powers are de facto 
exclusive in all areas of EU external action. If this is true then the Lisbon Treaty has 
forged either “a narrow definition of existence of implied powers” or “a broad definition 
of exclusive implied powers”.70 Both results would be out of tune with the CJEU’s long 
trail of case law on external implied powers. We need to note, however, that there is a 
fundamental difference between the two provisions. While Article 216 (1) TFEU tells 
us whether the EU has competence to conclude an international agreement (albeit 
exclusively or together with Member States), Article 3 (2) TFEU determines when the 
nature of such competence is exclusive.
71
 Hence, the issue of whether implied external 
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powers under Article 216 (1) TFEU are always exclusive shall be treated as distinct 
from the existence of such power. Article 3 (2) TFEU does not exist in splendid 
isolation and resort to it has been affected by the new EU external competences added 
to the Treaty of Lisbon. As such, one can empathise with Craig, who has stressed that ‘it 
will be rare, if ever, for the EU to lack power to conclude an international agreement.’72 
 
Meanwhile, there is a valid ground for criticism suggesting that in the post-Lisbon 
constellation mixity plays an immaterial role in EU implied external action. Even worse 
for the principle of subsidiarity, as Cremona put it, albeit in the context of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty, “implied shared competence would disappear”.73 Although silent 
on implied shared competence, Protocol 25 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty on the 
exercise of shared competence under Article 2 TFEU provides that “when the EU has 
taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those 
elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole 
area.” This formulation does not seem to exclude the application of the ERTA doctrine 
in the field of shared powers. If it did, Protocol 25 would have explicitly mentioned 
Article   3 (2) TFEU.
74
 Nonetheless, the exact facilitation required for the establishment 
of implied shared competence remains somewhat oblique after the Treaty of Lisbon.
75
 
On the one hand, according to the CJEU jurisprudence the EU has implied shared 
competence when the conclusion of an international agreement would facilitate the 
exercise of an internal competence. On the other hand, according to Article 216 (1) 
TFEU, the EU has implied shared competence when the conclusion of an international 
agreement is necessary for the attainment of the Treaty’s objectives.76  This lack of 
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2 
parity between the CJEU’s relevant case law and the draftsman’s choice of wording in 
Article 216 (1) TFEU raises questions as to whether pre-Lisbon decisions on implied 
shared powers can still be relied on by the CJEU in future cases.
77
   
 
Conclusion 
 
The formulation of Article 216 (1) TFEU with regard to the circumstances under which 
the EU may conclude an international agreement has not attracted much academic 
commentary. It has rather been considered as part and parcel of the reforms introduced 
in the area of EU external competence by the Lisbon Treaty.
78
 This is perhaps because 
the trend of codification of CJEU case law in the Treaties and EU secondary legislation 
is neither new nor rare.
 
Indeed, periodic EU Treaty revisions have codified numerous 
decisions emanating from the Luxembourg Court in Treaty provisions, sometimes even 
copying the CJEU’s phraseology in verbatim.79  For instance, the Maastricht Treaty 
confirmed the CJEU’s case law on development aid 80  by forging development 
cooperation as a distinct competence under what forms now Title XVI of the Treaty.
81
 
The Lisbon Treaty forms no exception. It includes various provisions, especially with 
reference to EU competences typology, where the drafter has expressly affirmed 
previous decisions of the European Courts.
82
 Similarly, as demonstrated in this article, 
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the Lisbon Treaty has attempted to codify the CJEU’s trail of complex judgments on EU 
implied external powers. Not only does it include a generic statement in Article 216 (1) 
TFEU about the existence of implied competence but it also explains in a separate 
provision (Article 3 (2) TFEU) when implied powers to conclude international 
agreements are exclusive. This addition compensates for the former provision’s lack of 
detail as to whether the nature of implied competence is exclusive or shared - i.e. 
whether external action is essential to achieve the objectives of the Treaty or merely 
facilitates them. Finally, there is no codification in the Treaty of implied shared powers 
which contradicts the CJEU’s acceptance of the fact that implied powers can be either 
exclusive or shared. If we accept that Lisbon attempted to constitutionalise the CJEU’s 
established case law, then the lack of a separate provision on implied shared powers 
appears to be an omission rather than an exclusion. 
 
EU foreign policy under the doctrine of implied powers is a fast-moving field and prior 
to Lisbon the CJEU kept moving the goalposts in the name of necessity, effectiveness 
and uniformity or, simply, pragmatism. One has to be reminded, however, that EU 
action, either internal or external, is confined by a number of organising constitutional 
principles inherent in the TEU. For instance, a wide interpretation of Article 216 (1) 
TFEU could ultimately arrogate to EU powers in infringement of the principle of 
conferral enshrined in Article 5 TEU. It could also be in breach of the principle of 
consistency, which provides that EU policies shall be in tune with each other.
83
 
Although not articulated in the general EU objectives, consistency appears to be 
justiciable under Art 21 (3) TEU. The reference to consistency qua sincere cooperation 
under Article 4 (3) TEU (which applies in as much to Member States as to the EU itself) 
is based on setting common principles and unified objectives in EU foreign policy 
whose aim is to eliminate contradiction.
84
  
 
As such, an orthodox interpretation of implied powers does not provide the EU 
legislature with a blank card to engage in a substantive expansion of EU external 
competence. Yet, in the words of a commentator, it is “through implied powers and the 
avoidance of mixity [that] the EU has been able to achieve greater efficacy” in all fields 
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of external action.
85
 But how far can the EU employ efficacy (or the effet-utile 
principle) as a raison d'être for concluding international agreements?  
 
It has so far been established that with reference to EU implied external powers, the 
Treaty of Lisbon has somewhat incompetently incorporated past CJEU case law. The 
drafter appears at times to have misunderstood what the CJEU did in its long 
jurisprudence on implied powers. Nonetheless, action under Article 216 (1) TFEU 
remains subject to conferral. It is only a Treaty making competence as opposed to a 
general legislative one and still, to some respect, subject to the ERTA doctrine. It, 
therefore, appears unlikely that the EU will turn such competence to an open sesame for 
entering, for instance, into international commitments in fields which are intimate to 
national sovereignty. Since review of decisions adopted pursuant to Article 216 (1) 
TFEU (and Article 3 (2) TFEU to the same extent) is left to the CJEU, the ultimate 
question is what will happen if a case lands before it to provide an opinion on its scope.  
 
It is likely that the CJEU will hold that for any matter that comes under EU objectives 
the EU legislature needs the right formulation. The CJEU will therefore decide cases 
according to what is politically expedient at a given moment. Yet, it is unlikely that the 
CJEU will push for further development of the doctrine of implied powers. It can be 
argued that similar to the CJEU’s rhetoric in Opinion 2/9486 with reference to the use of 
Article 352 TFEU (former Article 308 EC) as a means of the EU accession to the 
ECHR, any future expansive interpretation of Article 216 (1) TFEU, in the CFSP for 
instance, would require a Treaty revision. 
 
Still, however, one could argue that despite the fact that post-Lisbon the doctrine of 
implied powers has been entrusted to the Member States as the Masters of the Treaties, 
the CJEU may still continue to develop its implied powers case law. Such an argument 
may draw evidence from Opinion 1/2003 concerning EU competence to conclude the 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. In its judgment the CJEU adopted a restrictive approach to the 
ways in which implied powers may become exclusive. As such, the CJEU went against 
the spirit of Article III-323 of the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty which at the time 
was pending ratification in the Member States.
87
 Like the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
Constitutional Treaty purported to codify the CJEU’s established jurisprudence on 
implied powers providing for a similar open-ended treatise of implied powers. It is 
worth noting that Opinion 1/03 constitutes the last major development in the case law 
on implied powers. At the same time, it needs to be read against the particular context 
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of the case and not to be taken as an absolute authority in the field of implied external 
powers of the EU.
88
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has certainly changed the atmosphere in the area of external relations 
vis-à-vis competence delimitation. Despite the reforms discussed in this article, it is 
unlikely that the EU is going to centralise external action and take it away from the 
Member States. One has to consider the “counterfactual alternatives” before criticising 
the way the Lisbon Treaty has codified EU implied external competence.
89
 The prospect 
of repatriation to Member States of the current EU external powers independently 
seems unconvincing. A plethora of bilateral and trilateral agreements negotiated by 
Member States themselves would be the alternative to EU external action. To put it 
differently, Member States would have to cope with today’s complexities of foreign 
policy that the EU currently deals with on their behalf.  
 
What is more, there is a complex web of international obligations that binds Member 
States qua EU law. There are also externalities flowing independent of Member States’ 
collective action over the same issue. Not only such externalities / peculiarities have 
been respected by the EU, they have also been defended before international tribunals 
on behalf of the Member States. For instance, in the EC / Asbestos dispute, the former 
European Community successfully defended a French ban on asbestos against Canada’s 
protests.
90
 The WTO panel and appellate bodies found that the measure was justified to 
protect human health. All above reasons create a convincing case against repatriation of 
external competence back to the Member States. In light of the above it is also not 
surprising that the new Lisbon provisions on external action escaped the scrutiny of 
national courts including the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Lisbon Urteil.
91
 It seems 
that the benefits of EU external action reaped by Member States have outweighed the 
semantic drawbacks of implied powers under Article 216 (1) TFEU. 
 
The above thoughts, however, do not suggest that we should stop thinking about the 
scope of EU external competence and ways to better our understanding as to how the 
EU conducts its foreign policy, notwithstanding expressly or impliedly. The present 
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author speculates that the transition from the pre-Lisbon delimitation of competence 
based broadly on effet utile to the current one based on an attempt to codify the CJEU’s  
jurisprudence will be much less workable than one would have imagined back when the 
Lisbon Treaty was drafted. Member States should, however, approach such problems 
with a critical eye and not with negativism pointing to yet another Treaty revision. This 
is crucial in the context of the doctrine of implied external powers, whose 
constitutionalisation suggests that any further contribution to its development by the 
CJEU has ceased. Therefore, although the CJEU remains the initiator of the implied 
powers doctrine, any future change in its scope lies with the Member States acting 
collectively in the European Council by amending the Treaty. This development shifts 
the burden of responsibility on the Member States (the political level) to determine the 
scope of EU powers in the foreign domain.  
 
It is suggested that the EU’s heads of state and government need to be equipped with the 
technicalities which characterise the complex system of EU external relations before 
they sit on the negotiating table. The UK balance of competence review, which is an 
audit of what the EU does and how it affects the UK and involves academics, 
practitioners and policy makers, is a good example of inter-state assessment on how EU 
law has impacted Member States in a variety of areas. It aims, inter alia, to predict the 
circumstances where Member States, contrary to the principle of conferral and 
subsidiarity, are liable to be prevented from acting autonomously in the international 
arena. Not surprisingly, a scrutiny of the scope of EU implied powers constitutes a key 
part of this review.
92
  
 
To conclude, the above analysis has established that the Lisbon Treaty provisions on 
external competence do not entail a wholesale diminution of the role of Member States. 
The notion of implied powers in EU external relations law, however, constitutes an 
example of loose codification of the CJEU’s long and complex jurisprudence. 
Nonetheless, as it has been argued in this contribution, the supervening exclusivity 
mandated through Article 216 (1) TFEU does not constitute a revolving door which 
would generate an unprecedented expansion of EU powers in the field of EU external 
action. No doubt, competence overlaps are inevitable – yet they need to be managed 
pragmatically. Grey areas, such as the somewhat sloppy drafting of Article 216 (1) 
TFEU, are bound to exist and constitutional lawyers will agree that it is a fact of life 
that any amount of re-drafting rules will not change that overnight. 
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